Is a unique Cournot equilibrium locally stable?

DOI10.1006/GAME.1999.0768MaRDI QIDQ1590686zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar

Publication date 11 March 2004

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0768

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot equilibriumduopolyoligopolystability of equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Review text

The paper deals with the problem of local stability of the regular and unique Cournot equilibrium in homogeneous product oligopolies. The main results show that for a duopoly the local stability is always guaranteed. For a more general finite number of firms in asymmetric cost oligopoly the local stability is achieved under very general conditions, which are much more liberal than those ones known from the literature. Moreover, in the case of symmetric cost oligopoly the local stability exists almost always except some perverse cases.

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Cites work

• A Dual Stability Theorem
• A Note on the Stability Conditions in Cournot's Dynamic Market Solution When Neither the Actual Market Demand Function Nor the Production Levels of Rivals are Known
• Comparative Statics for Oligopoly
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3599745 (Why is no real title available?)
• Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Uniqueness of a Cournot Equilibrium
• Some Examples of Global Instability of the Competitive Equilibrium
• Stability of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium: The multiproduct case
• The stability of Cournot revisited
• The stability of the Cournot oligopoly model: a reassessment

Cited in

(26)

• Free entry and stability in a Cournot model
• Stability and instability in oligopoly
• Dynamics of the Cournot oligopoly with multi-product firms
• Should sophisticated expectations facilitate reaching equilibrium behavior?
• Market size, entry costs and free entry Cournot equilibrium
• Cournot equilibrium revisited
• Does local monopolistic approximation imply a less stable equilibrium?
• Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games
• On the relationship between uniqueness and stability in sum-aggregative, symmetric and general differentiable games
• Equilibrium uniqueness results for Cournot oligopolies revisited
• When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
• GLOBAL STABILITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN AGGREGATIVE GAMES
• Licensing under general demand and cost functions
• Some notes on the stability of a simple Cournot economy with a Leontief technology
• A note on the equilibria of an economic model with local competition ``à la Cournot
• Behavioural heterogeneity and Cournot oligopoly equilibrium
• On local stability of Cournot models with simultaneous and sequential decisions
• STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIUM IN BERTRAND AND COURNOT DUOPOLIES
• Existence of unique equilibrium in Cournot mixed oligopoly
• On the stability of oligopoly model with a Cournot fringe
• Oligopoly and stability
• On the existence of stable equilibria in monotone games
• Global stability of unique Nash equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly and rent-seeking game
• Local stability of the Cournot solution with increasing heterogeneous competitors
• Locally consistent oligopolistic equilibria are Cournot-Walras equilibria
• Is having a unique equilibrium robust?

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