Global stability of unique Nash equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly and rent-seeking game
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Publication:844641
DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2007.05.003zbMATH Open1181.91062OpenAlexW1975698660MaRDI QIDQ844641FDOQ844641
Authors: K. Okuguchi, Takeshi Yamazaki 
Publication date: 19 January 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2007.05.003
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Cites Work
- Expectations and stability in oligopoly models
- Cournot oligopoly and the theory of supermodular games
- The stability of the Cournot oligopoly model: a reassessment
- Stability and instability in oligopoly
- Is a unique Cournot equilibrium locally stable?
- Comparative Statics for Oligopoly
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
- On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
- The asymptotic behavior of dynamic rent-seeking games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (10)
- On the convergence to the Cournot equilibrium in a productive asset oligopoly
- On the Works of Professor Koji Okuguchi
- Technical note -- Global robust stability in a general price and assortment competition model
- On the relationship between uniqueness and stability in sum-aggregative, symmetric and general differentiable games
- Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes
- On the stability of quadratic dynamics in discrete time \(n\)-player Cournot games
- Nash equilibrium and robust stability in dynamic games: a small-gain perspective
- Sufficient and necessary conditions for equilibrium uniqueness in aggregative games
- Existence of unique equilibrium in Cournot mixed oligopoly
- GLOBAL STABILITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN AGGREGATIVE GAMES
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