Does local monopolistic approximation imply a less stable equilibrium?
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Publication:2294225
DOI10.1016/j.orl.2018.08.001zbMath1476.91090OpenAlexW2887569729MaRDI QIDQ2294225
Publication date: 10 February 2020
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2018.08.001
Cites Work
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