Game dynamics in Mendelian populations

DOI10.1007/BF00337287zbMath0473.92015OpenAlexW2068650892MaRDI QIDQ1159150

Josef Hofbauer, Karl Sigmund, Peter Schuster

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Biological Cybernetics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00337287

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionarily stable strategieslimit cyclessexual reproductiongene frequenciesanimal conflictsHardy-Weinberg-equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Topological structure of integral curves, singular points, limit cycles of ordinary differential equations (34C05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Genetics and epigenetics (92D10) Dynamical systems and ergodic theory (37-XX)

Related Items (13)

Non-cooperative two-person games in biology: A classification ⋮ Fixation probabilities in evolutionary game dynamics with a two-strategy game in finite diploid populations ⋮ Evolutionary stable strategies: A review of basic theory ⋮ From genes to games: cooperation and cyclic dominance in meiotic drive ⋮ A maximum principle for frequency dependent selection ⋮ The predator-dependent replicator dynamics ⋮ A class of fast-slow models for adaptive resistance evolution ⋮ Random and non-random mating populations: evolutionary dynamics in meiotic drive ⋮ Slow-fast stochastic diffusion dynamics and quasi-stationarity for diploid populations with varying size ⋮ Strategy abundance in evolutionary many-player games with multiple strategies ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ The probability of permanence ⋮ Spatial Mendelian games

Cites Work

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• Mass action kinetics of selfreplication in flow reactors
• Selfregulation of behaviour in animal societies. I. Symmetric contests
• The Hopf bifurcation and its applications. With contributions by P. Chernoff, G. Childs, S. Chow, J. R. Dorroh, J. Guckenheimer, L. Howard, N. Kopell, O. Lanford, J. Mallet-Paret, G. Oster, O. Ruiz, S. Schecter, D. Schmidt, and S. Smale
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• On the occurrence of limit cycles in the Volterra-Lotka equation

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