Evolutionary games on the lattice: death-birth updating process

DOI10.1214/16-EJP4380zbMATH Open1336.91019arXiv1506.07233MaRDI QIDQ287713FDOQ287713

Authors: Stephen Evilsizor, N. Lanchier 

Publication date: 23 May 2016

Published in: Electronic Journal of Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: This paper is concerned with the death-birth updating process. This model is an example of a spatial game in which players located on the~$d$-dimensional integer lattice are characterized by one of two possible strategies and update their strategy at rate one by mimicking one of their neighbors chosen at random with a probability proportional to the neighbor's payoff. To understand the role of space in the form of local interactions, the process is compared with its non-spatial deterministic counterpart for well-mixing populations, which is described by the replicator equation. To begin with, we prove that, provided the range of the interactions is sufficiently large, both strategies coexist on the lattice for a parameter region where the replicator equation also exhibits coexistence. Then, we identify parameter regions in which there is a dominant strategy that always wins on the lattice whereas the replicator equation displays either coexistence or bistability. Finally, we show that, for the one-dimensional nearest neighbor system and in the parameter region corresponding to the prisoner's dilemma game, cooperators can win on the lattice whereas defectors always win in well-mixing populations, thus showing that space favors cooperation. In particular, several parameter regions where the spatial and non-spatial models disagree are identified.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1506.07233

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zbMATH Keywords

cooperationprisoner's dilemmareplicator equationevolutionary game theoryinteracting particle systemsdeath-birth updating processevolutionary stable strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Interacting random processes; statistical mechanics type models; percolation theory (60K35) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cited In (6)

• Evolutionary games on the lattice: death and birth of the fittest
• Wright-Fisher diffusions in stochastic spatial evolutionary games with death-birth updating
• Local interactions promote cooperation in cooperator-defector systems
• Evolutionary games on the lattice: payoffs affecting birth and death rates
• Moran-type bounds for the fixation probability in a frequency-dependent Wright-Fisher model
• A spatial model for selection and cooperation

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