Game-theoretical approach for opinion dynamics on social networks
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Publication:6565129
DOI10.1063/5.0084178MaRDI QIDQ6565129FDOQ6565129
Attila Szolnoki, Zhifang Li, Han-Xin Yang, Xiaojie Chen
Publication date: 1 July 2024
Published in: Chaos (Search for Journal in Brave)
Genetics and population dynamics (92Dxx) Game theory (91Axx) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91Dxx)
Cites Work
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