OPINION FORMATION MODELS BASED ON GAME THEORY
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Publication:3500191
DOI10.1142/S012918310701139XzbMATH Open1200.91014arXivphysics/0609127OpenAlexW2060634340WikidataQ59393158 ScholiaQ59393158MaRDI QIDQ3500191FDOQ3500191
Authors: Alessandro di Mare, Vito Latora 
Publication date: 3 June 2008
Published in: International Journal of Modern Physics C (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: A way to simulate the basic interactions between two individuals with different opinions, in the context of strategic game theory, is proposed. Various games are considered, which produce different kinds of opinion formation dynamics. First, by assuming that all individuals (players) are equals, we obtain the bounded confidence model of continuous opinion dynamics proposed by Deffuant et al. In such a model a tolerance threshold is defined, such that individuals with difference in opinion larger than the threshold can not interact. Then, we consider that the individuals have different inclinations to change opinion and different abilities in convincing the others. In this way, we obtain the so-called ``Stubborn individuals and Orators (SO) model, a generalization of the Deffuant et al. model, in which the threshold tolerance is different for every couple of individuals. We explore, by numerical simulations, the dynamics of the SO model, and we propose further generalizations that can be implemented.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0609127
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- First‐Order Continuous Models of Opinion Formation
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- A game approach to multi-dimensional opinion dynamics in social networks with stubborn strategist agents
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