OPINION FORMATION MODELS BASED ON GAME THEORY
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Publication:3500191
Abstract: A way to simulate the basic interactions between two individuals with different opinions, in the context of strategic game theory, is proposed. Various games are considered, which produce different kinds of opinion formation dynamics. First, by assuming that all individuals (players) are equals, we obtain the bounded confidence model of continuous opinion dynamics proposed by Deffuant et al. In such a model a tolerance threshold is defined, such that individuals with difference in opinion larger than the threshold can not interact. Then, we consider that the individuals have different inclinations to change opinion and different abilities in convincing the others. In this way, we obtain the so-called ``Stubborn individuals and Orators (SO) model, a generalization of the Deffuant et al. model, in which the threshold tolerance is different for every couple of individuals. We explore, by numerical simulations, the dynamics of the SO model, and we propose further generalizations that can be implemented.
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