Opinion Formation Games with Dynamic Social Influences

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_31zbMath1404.91043OpenAlexW2560193587MaRDI QIDQ2959850

Vittorio Bilò, Luca Moscardelli, Angelo Fanelli

Publication date: 10 February 2017

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_31

zbMATH Keywords

pure Nash equilibriaopinion formation gamessocial optima

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (5)

Opinion dynamics with limited information ⋮ Opinion formation games with aggregation and negative influence ⋮ Opinion dynamics with limited information ⋮ Bounding the inefficiency of compromise in opinion formation ⋮ Social pressure in opinion dynamics

Cites Work

• Decentralized dynamics for finite opinion games
• On discrete preferences and coordination
• Potential games
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• Social influence and opinions
• Reaching a Consensus
• Emergence of segregation in evolving social networks
• Graph fission in an evolving voter model
• How Bad is Forming Your Own Opinion?
• Coevolutionary opinion formation games

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