Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.01.011zbMath1397.91076OpenAlexW2149719236WikidataQ39661356 ScholiaQ39661356MaRDI QIDQ1784222

Martin A. Nowak, David G. Rand

Publication date: 26 September 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.01.011

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryevolution of cooperationweak selectionbackwards inductionfixed length games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (11)

Stochastic evolutionary dynamics resolve the traveler's dilemma ⋮ Evolutionary game analysis of cooperation between microgrid and conventional grid ⋮ General conditions for strategy abundance through a self-referential mechanism under weak selection ⋮ Delayed and inconsistent information and the evolution of trust ⋮ Probabilistic reward or punishment promotes cooperation in evolutionary games ⋮ Stochastic dynamics in the fitness-based process which can be on behalf of the standard Moran, local and Wright-Fisher processes ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas with assortative interactions ⋮ A random world is a fair world ⋮ Evolution of fairness in the one-shot anonymous Ultimatum Game ⋮ Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible ⋮ Limit Cycles Sparked by Mutation in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

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