Evolution of spite in an n-player game with an opting-out option

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2023.111585MaRDI QIDQ6078377zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shun Kurokawa

Publication date 27 September 2023

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2023.111585

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryspite\(n\)-player gameopting out

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Animal behavior (92D50) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Recommendations

• Tag-based spite with correlated interactions
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Cites work

• A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the prisoner's dilemma game
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• On Information and Sufficiency

Cited in

(3)

• The `spite' dilemma: spite or no spite, is there a dilemma?
• Tag-based spite with correlated interactions
• Evolution of spite versus evolution of altruism through a disbandment mechanism

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