Evolution of spite in an n-player game with an opting-out option

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2023.111585zbMATH Open1521.92104OpenAlexW4385327299MaRDI QIDQ6078377FDOQ6078377

Shun Kurokawa

Publication date: 27 September 2023

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2023.111585

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zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryspite\(n\)-player gameopting out

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Animal behavior (92D50) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• On Information and Sufficiency
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the prisoner's dilemma game

Cited In (2)

• Evolution of spite versus evolution of altruism through a disbandment mechanism
• The `spite' dilemma: spite or no spite, is there a dilemma?

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