Bilateral negotiation facilitates stable coexistence of cooperation with defection in Prisoner's dilemma game

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2024.128591MaRDI QIDQ6132095zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors

Publication date 18 April 2024

Published in Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationreplicator dynamicsPrisoner's dilemma gamebilateral negotiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX) Genetics and population dynamics (92Dxx) Game theory (91Axx)

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