Bilateral negotiation facilitates stable coexistence of cooperation with defection in Prisoner's dilemma game
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Publication:6132095
DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2024.128591WikidataQ128543203 ScholiaQ128543203MaRDI QIDQ6132095FDOQ6132095
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Publication date: 18 April 2024
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX) Genetics and population dynamics (92Dxx) Game theory (91Axx)
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