Truncation selection and payoff distributions applied to the replicator equation

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.06.020zbMath1343.92360OpenAlexW2469978459WikidataQ50621315 ScholiaQ50621315MaRDI QIDQ307646

Chris T. Bauch, Bryce Morsky

Publication date: 5 September 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.06.020

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicscooperationevolutionary game theoryESStruncation selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of game theory (91A80) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

Cheater-altruist synergy in public goods games, The impact of truncation selection and diffusion on cooperation in spatial games

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