Information structures and decentralizability of equilibria

DOI10.1007/BF01213444zbMATH Open0866.90140OpenAlexW2025486390MaRDI QIDQ2365069FDOQ2365069

Authors: J. Kline 

Publication date: 4 February 1997

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01213444

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zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumsubgame perfect equilibriumextensive gamedecentralizability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Cites Work

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Sequential Equilibria
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On stability of perfect equilibrium points

Cited In (7)

• Information, variance and cooperation: minimal models
• Decentralisation conscious players and system reliability
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the interactions of incentive and information structures
• Optimal intertemporal allocation mechanisms and decentralization of decisions
• The Decentralization of Information Processing in the Presence of Interactions

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