Slightly altruistic equilibria

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In a non cooperative game with payoff function \(f_i\) for each player \(i\), a Nash equilibrium \(s\) is said to be a \textit{slightly altruistic equilibrium} if there exists a sequence of strategy profiles \((s_n)_n\) converging to \(s\), and a sequence \((\varepsilon_n)_n\) decreasing to zero, such that for every \(n\): the profile \(s_n\) is a Nash equilibrium of the game where each player \(i\) has \(f_i +\varepsilon_n \sum_{j \neq i} f_j\) as payoff function. Existence of a slightly altruistic equilibrium is guaranteed in finite games with mixed strategies. Connections with other refinements, and with the friendliness property are studied. It is proved that an essential equilibrium of a finite game in mixed strategies is a slightly altruistic equilibrium.



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