Analysis on altruism-based coopetition game of oligarchic enterprises: a validation of generation companies

DOI10.1155/2020/9470623MaRDI QIDQ2007167zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 12 October 2020

Published in Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1155/2020/9470623

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Review text

Summary: For the long-term sustainable development, the modern enterprises should consider both competition and cooperation. In the current studies of corporate competition strategies and games, the quantification of cooperation-competition (coopetition) between enterprises is not deeply investigated. In this paper, we establish a coopetition game model of oligarchic enterprises in the industry by using the quantitative altruistic factor and nonlinear cost function, analyze the influence of altruistic factor on equilibrium variables, and then validate it in the generation side market. The following conclusions are drawn: (1) the coopetition of any form will increase the market equilibrium price and the total equilibrium profit of the industry, which induces the motivation and intention of cooperation between oligarchic enterprises. (2) The increased unilateral altruism is instable and unsustainable because it will produce an altruistic threshold that makes the total equilibrium profit of the industry increase and then decrease. The unilateral altruism of high-cost generation companies is more beneficial for increasing the total equilibrium profit of the industry, but it is realized in a difficult way. Due to a higher initial altruism level, there is lack of motivation for the increased unilateral altruism. (3) The mutually altruistic coopetition is the most effective way for improving the total equilibrium profit of the industry, but it is hard to finally achieve the complete monopoly because of cost differentiation. (4) The established game model of generation market is more universal and provides a certain quantitative interpretation for electricity crisis.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(1)

• Cooperation promotes the sustainability of companies: lattice-gas model for a market

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