Resolution of the n-person prisoners' dilemma by Kalai's preplay negotiation procedure

DOI10.1142/S0219198923500135zbMATH Open1537.91008MaRDI QIDQ6545009FDOQ6545009

Authors: Ko Nishihara 

Publication date: 28 May 2024

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

perfect equilibriumproper equilibriumpreplay negotiation\(n\)-person prisoners' dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Cites Work

• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Cooperation in Repeated Games When the Number of Stages is not Commonly Known
• Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma
• A resolution of \(N\)-person prisoners' dilemma
• On stability of perfect equilibrium points
• Unanimity games and Pareto optimality
• Stability of the cooperative equilibrium in \(N\)-person prisoners' dilemma with sequential moves
• Approval mechanism to solve prisoner's dilemma: comparison with Varian's compensation mechanism

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