On the existence and efficiency of the von neumann-morgenstern stable set in a n-player prisoners' dilemma
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Publication:1414404
DOI10.1007/S001820100081zbMATH Open1082.91006OpenAlexW2028230252MaRDI QIDQ1414404FDOQ1414404
Authors: Noritsugu Nakanishi 
Publication date: 23 November 2003
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100081
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Cited In (10)
- The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of \(2\times 2\) games
- Farsighted stability in an \(n\)-person prisoner's dilemma
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets, discounting, and Nash bargaining
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set bridges time-preferences to the Nash solution
- Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games
- Cooperative games (von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets)
- Noncooperative farsighted stable set in an \(n\)-player prisoners' dilemma
- Conservative stable standards of behavior and \(\varphi\)-stable sets
- The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency
- Resolution of the \(n\)-person prisoners' dilemma by Kalai's preplay negotiation procedure
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