Information structures and decentralizability of equilibria

DOI10.1007/BF01213444MaRDI QIDQ2365069zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors J. Kline

Publication date 4 February 1997

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01213444

zbMATH Keywords

decentralizabilityextensive gameNash equilibriumsubgame perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3399008 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
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Cited in

(7)

• Optimal intertemporal allocation mechanisms and decentralization of decisions
• On the interactions of incentive and information structures
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3980852 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 13843 (Why is no real title available?)
• The Decentralization of Information Processing in the Presence of Interactions
• Decentralisation conscious players and system reliability
• Information, variance and cooperation: minimal models

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