EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN STOCHASTIC GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198903001082zbMath1118.91301OpenAlexW3122608357MaRDI QIDQ4474571

Ronald J. A. P. Peeters, P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Publication date: 12 July 2004

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903001082

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic tracing procedure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (3)

Selection of a correlated equilibrium in Markov stopping games ⋮ A variant of Harsanyi's tracing procedures to select a perfect equilibrium in normal form games ⋮ Global Newton method for stochastic games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n- person noncooperative games
• Non-cooperative games
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games
• Noncooperative Stochastic Games
• A differentiable homotopy to compute Nash equilibria of \(n\)-person games
• Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions

This page was built for publication: EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN STOCHASTIC GAMES