Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games
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Publication:4530985
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00156zbMATH Open1020.91007OpenAlexW2032115841MaRDI QIDQ4530985FDOQ4530985
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00156
Cited In (11)
- EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN STOCHASTIC GAMES
- Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games
- Identification and estimation of sequential games of incomplete information with multiple equilibria
- Dynamic pricing with uncertain production cost: an alternating-move approach
- Markov perfect equilibria in repeated asynchronous choice games
- Backward dynamics in economics. The inverse limit approach
- A game theoretic approach to option valuation under Markovian regime-switching models
- Global Newton method for stochastic games
- Multilateral negotiations and formation of coalitions
- The Condorcet paradox revisited
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
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