Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00156zbMath1020.91007OpenAlexW2032115841MaRDI QIDQ4530985

Roger D. Lagunoff, Hans H. Haller

Publication date: 28 May 2002

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00156

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic gamesMarkov perfect equilibriagenericity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

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