Selection in dynamic entry games

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0571MaRDI QIDQ1378016zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Denis Gromb, David Sevy, Jean Pierre Ponssard

Publication date 27 July 1998

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/b88ba27654dd972d53040b44da7d74e2adc6e592

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric firmsdynamic competitionentry deterrencegame theoretic frameworksymmetric firms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games
• Efficient entry
• EFFICIENCY IN DYNAMIC ENTRY GAMES: THE CASE OF QUANTITY COMPETITION
• DYNAMIC ENTRY GAMES: THE CASE OF NATURAL DUOPOLY

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099357 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
• Efficiency of dynamic quantity competition: A remark on Markovian equilibria
• Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
• Forward induction and sunk costs give average cost pricing
• What do discounted optima converge to!: A theory of discount rate asymptotics in economic models

Cited in

(9)

• EFFICIENCY IN DYNAMIC ENTRY GAMES: THE CASE OF QUANTITY COMPETITION
• Efficiency and competition in the long run: The survival of the unfit
• Drugs, guns, and targeted competition
• Efficient entry
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2131734 (Why is no real title available?)
• Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games
• Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841903 (Why is no real title available?)
• DYNAMIC ENTRY GAMES: THE CASE OF NATURAL DUOPOLY

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