Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory

DOI10.1111/0034-6527.00290zbMATH Open1096.91008OpenAlexW3126072805MaRDI QIDQ4823481FDOQ4823481

Authors Dorothea Kübler, Georg Weizsäcker

Publication date 28 October 2004

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/508/1/kwfinal.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cited in

(21)

• On the beliefs off the path: equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-\(k\)
• Belief updating and the demand for information
• Multiple motives of pro-social behavior: evidence from the solidarity game
• Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
• A cognitive hierarchy model of learning in networks
• Strategic reasoning in \(p\)-beauty contests
• Informational herding with model misspecification
• Fragility of information cascades: an experimental study using elicited beliefs
• Herding, social preferences and (non-)conformity
• Cognitively-constrained learning from neighbors
• An experiment of social learning with endogenous timing
• Averting economic collapse and the solipsism bias
• Altruistic observational learning
• Paying for confidence: an experimental study of the demand for non-instrumental information
• Information choice in a social learning experiment
• Error cascades in observational learning: an experiment on the Chinos game
• An experiment on behavior in social learning games with collective preferences
• Voting behavior under outside pressure: promoting true majorities with sequential voting?
• Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction
• Social learning in networks: a quantal response equilibrium analysis of experimental data
• Self-Correcting Information Cascades

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