Informational herding with model misspecification

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.01.011MaRDI QIDQ281347zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors J. Aislinn Bohren

Publication date 11 May 2016

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/14-007.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

informational herdingmodel misspecificationobservational learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
• Bayesian learning in social networks
• Bounded memory and biases in information processing
• Cursed Equilibrium
• First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias
• Fragility of asymptotic agreement under Bayesian learning
• Fragility of information cascades: an experimental study using elicited beliefs
• Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory
• Limiting Behavior of Posterior Distributions when the Model is Incorrect
• Non-Bayesian learning
• Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
• Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions
• Reaching a Consensus
• Self-Correcting Information Cascades
• Social learning in a changing world

Cited in

(19)

• Herding with costly information
• Asymptotic behavior of Bayesian learners with misspecified models
• Combining forecasts in the presence of ambiguity over correlation structures
• Learning with misattribution of reference dependence
• Biased learning under ambiguous information
• The probability of pluralistic ignorance
• Learning with heterogeneous misspecified models: characterization and robustness
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5603010 (Why is no real title available?)
• Misinterpreting others and the fragility of social learning
• Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems
• Which misspecifications persist?
• A multi-agent model of misspecified learning with overconfidence
• Belief formation under signal correlation
• Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form
• Overconfidence and prejudice
• Misspecified learning and evolutionary stability
• Expectations and learning from prices
• Organizational structure and pricing: evidence from a large U.S. airline
• The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning

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