A multi-agent model of misspecified learning with overconfidence

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.08.007MaRDI QIDQ6148382zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Cuimin Ba, Alice Gindin

Publication date 11 January 2024

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.007

zbMATH Keywords

informational externalitiesmisspecified learningmultiple agentsoverconfidence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• Unrealistic expectations and misguided learning
• Biased learning creates overconfidence
• Informational herding with model misspecification
• Convergence in models of misspecified learning
• Overconfidence by Bayesian-rational agents

Cites work

• Active learning with a misspecified prior
• Asymptotic behavior of Bayesian learners with misspecified models
• Belief Convergence under Misspecified Learning: A Martingale Approach
• Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents With Misspecified Models
• Convergence in models of misspecified learning
• First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias
• Informational herding with model misspecification
• Learning in mis-specified models and the possibility of cycles
• Learning with heterogeneous misspecified models: characterization and robustness
• Limit points of endogenous misspecified learning
• Misinterpreting others and the fragility of social learning
• Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems
• The Positive Effects of Biased Self-Perceptions in Firms*
• Unrealistic expectations and misguided learning
• What to maximize if you must

Cited in

(1)

• Misspecified learning and evolutionary stability

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