Misspecified learning and evolutionary stability
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Cites work
- A biological basis for expected and non-expected utility
- A multi-agent model of misspecified learning with overconfidence
- Active learning with a misspecified prior
- Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
- Asymptotic behavior of Bayesian learners with misspecified models
- Belief Convergence under Misspecified Learning: A Martingale Approach
- Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents With Misspecified Models
- Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information
- Competing Models
- Do Markets Favor Agents able to Make Accurate Predictions?
- Dynamic concern for misspecification
- Evolution of Preferences1
- Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
- Informational herding with model misspecification
- Learning and model validation
- Learning in mis-specified models and the possibility of cycles
- Learning underspecified models
- Learning with heterogeneous misspecified models: characterization and robustness
- Limit points of endogenous misspecified learning
- Limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games
- Limiting Behavior of Posterior Distributions when the Model is Incorrect
- Misinterpreting others and the fragility of social learning
- Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems
- Network structure and naive sequential learning
- Rule rationality
- Three steps ahead
- Unrealistic expectations and misguided learning
- Which misspecifications persist?
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