Belief formation under signal correlation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.05.004zbMATH Open1546.9111MaRDI QIDQ6584591FDOQ6584591

Tanjim Hossain, Ryo Okui

Publication date: 8 August 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

belief elicitationinformation processingnon-Bayesian updatingcorrelation neglectvariance misperception

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Cites Work

• The Binarized Scoring Rule
• Informational herding with model misspecification
• Combining forecasts in the presence of ambiguity over correlation structures
• Correlation Neglect in Belief Formation
• Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games
• Learning With Heterogeneous Misspecified Models: Characterization and Robustness
• Extensive Imitation is Irrational and Harmful*
• Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents With Misspecified Models

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