Belief formation under signal correlation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.05.004MaRDI QIDQ6584591zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Tanjim Hossain, Ryo Okui

Publication date 8 August 2024

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2024.05.004

zbMATH Keywords

belief elicitationcorrelation neglectinformation processingnon-Bayesian updatingvariance misperception

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05) Decision theory (91B06)

Recommendations

• Correlation neglect in belief formation
• Belief updating and the demand for information
• Correlation neglect in voting decisions: an experiment
• Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment
• Non-Bayesian updating in a social learning experiment

Cites work

• Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents With Misspecified Models
• Combining forecasts in the presence of ambiguity over correlation structures
• Correlation neglect in belief formation
• Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games
• Extensive imitation is irrational and harmful
• Informational herding with model misspecification
• Learning with heterogeneous misspecified models: characterization and robustness
• The binarized scoring rule

Cited in

(1)

• Correlation concern

This page was built for publication: Belief formation under signal correlation

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6584591)