Level-k reasoning in a generalized beauty contest

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.04.002zbMATH Open1296.91134OpenAlexW3121961279MaRDI QIDQ2016241FDOQ2016241

Xianwen Shi, Artie Zillante, Dmitry A. Shapiro

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.04.002

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gameslevel-\(k\) modelsbeauty contests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Econometric specification of stochastic discount factor models
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• Efficient Use of Information and Social�Value�of�Information
• Out of your mind: eliciting individual reasoning in one shot games

Cited In (6)

• The Predominant Role of Signal Precision in Experimental Beauty Contests
• Coordination under limited depth of reasoning
• Knowing me, imagining you: projection and overbidding in auctions
• An Adversarial Risk Analysis Framework for Batch Acceptance Problems
• Depth of Reasoning and Information Revelation: An Experiment on the Distribution of k-Levels
• Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game

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