Private and public information in self-fulfilling currency crises
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Publication:698194
DOI10.1007/S712-002-8221-XzbMATH Open1010.91062OpenAlexW1973295636MaRDI QIDQ698194FDOQ698194
Authors: Christina E. Metz 
Publication date: 18 September 2002
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40288
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Cited In (12)
- Coordination under limited depth of reasoning
- Information dissemination in currency crises
- Public information and global games with strategic complements and substitutes
- An interpretation of the collapsing process of the Bretton Woods system
- On credible monetary policy and private government information
- Information acquisition in global games of regime change
- Information quality and crises in regime-change games
- Observing each other's observations in a Bayesian coordination game
- CURRENCY ATTACKS WITH MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION: THE ROLE OF WAGE-SETTERS
- Credit ratings and liquidity crises
- Public information, private information, and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games.
- Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders
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