Private and public information in self-fulfilling currency crises
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(12)- On credible monetary policy and private government information
- An interpretation of the collapsing process of the Bretton Woods system
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- Public information, private information, and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games.
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- Information acquisition in global games of regime change
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- Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders
- Public information and global games with strategic complements and substitutes
- Coordination under limited depth of reasoning
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