Private and public information in self-fulfilling currency crises

DOI10.1007/S712-002-8221-XMaRDI QIDQ698194zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Christina E. Metz

Publication date 18 September 2002

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40288

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriacurrency crisesself-fulfilling expectationsprivate and public information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Information dissemination in currency crises
• Self-fulfilling currency crises with borrowing constraints and domestic currency debt
• CURRENCY ATTACKS WITH MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION: THE ROLE OF WAGE-SETTERS
• Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders
• Information quality and crises in regime-change games

Cited in

(12)

• On credible monetary policy and private government information
• An interpretation of the collapsing process of the Bretton Woods system
• Observing each other's observations in a Bayesian coordination game
• Information dissemination in currency crises
• Public information, private information, and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games.
• Credit ratings and liquidity crises
• Information acquisition in global games of regime change
• Information quality and crises in regime-change games
• CURRENCY ATTACKS WITH MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION: THE ROLE OF WAGE-SETTERS
• Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders
• Public information and global games with strategic complements and substitutes
• Coordination under limited depth of reasoning

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