A note on stabilizing cooperation in the centipede game

DOI10.3390/G11030035MaRDI QIDQ2221291zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour

Publication date 26 January 2021

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g11030035

zbMATH Keywords

centipede gamepayoff exchangeprisoners's dilemmasubgame-perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Cooperative games (91A12)

Review text

Summary: In the much-studied centipede game, which resembles the iterated prisoners' dilemma, two players successively choose between (1) cooperating, by continuing play, or (2) defecting and terminating play. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium implies that play terminates on the first move, even though continuing play can benefit both players -- but not if the rival defects immediately, which it has an incentive to do. We show that, without changing the structure of the game, interchanging the payoffs of the two players provides each with an incentive to cooperate whenever its turn comes up. The Nash equilibrium in the transformed centipede game, called the reciprocity game, is unique -- unlike the centipede game, wherein there are several Nash equilibria. The reciprocity game can be implemented noncooperatively by adding, at the start of the centipede game, a move to exchange payoffs, which it is rational for the players to choose. What this interchange signifies, and its application to transforming an arms race into an arms-control treaty, are discussed.

Recommendations

• Competitive centipede games: zero-end payoffs and payoff inequality deter reciprocal cooperation
• Arms races as iterated prisoner's dilemma games
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Cites work

• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
• Cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: an investigation on learning
• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• Iterated prisoner's dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
• Non-equilibrium play in centipede games
• The evolution of cooperation

Cited in

(8)

• Competitive centipede games: zero-end payoffs and payoff inequality deter reciprocal cooperation
• Non-equilibrium play in centipede games
• Cooperation for pennies: A note on \(\varepsilon\)-equilibria
• An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games
• Introduction to the special issue ``pro-sociality and cooperation
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 509225 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the centipede game with a social norm
• A note on inducing cooperation by reciprocative strategy

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