Strategic pattern recognition -- experimental evidence.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00040-XMaRDI QIDQ1408718zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Doron Sonsino, Julia Sirota

Publication date 25 September 2003

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

LearningReciprocityBattle of the SexesEquilibrium-patterns

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45877 (Why is no real title available?)
• Discrete sequence prediction and its applications
• Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games
• Gender-based focal points
• Learning to learn, pattern recognition, and Nash equilibrium
• Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests

Cited in

(4)

• Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence
• The battle of the sexes when the future is important
• Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game
• Beyond fictitious play beliefs: incorporating pattern recognition and similarity matching

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