Strategic pattern recognition -- experimental evidence.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00040-XzbMATH Open1056.91010MaRDI QIDQ1408718FDOQ1408718

Authors: Doron Sonsino, Julia Sirota 

Publication date: 25 September 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Learning to learn, pattern recognition, and Nash equilibrium
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zbMATH Keywords

LearningReciprocityBattle of the SexesEquilibrium-patterns

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
• Learning to learn, pattern recognition, and Nash equilibrium
• Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Gender-based focal points
• Discrete sequence prediction and its applications

Cited In (4)

• Beyond fictitious play beliefs: incorporating pattern recognition and similarity matching
• Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game
• Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence
• The battle of the sexes when the future is important

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