Convergence of Bayesian learning to general equilibrium in mis-specified models.

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00062-9zbMath1042.91028MaRDI QIDQ1867783

Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Jan Tuinstra, Dries Vermeulen

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

global stabilityBayesian learningconjectural equilibriumdisequilibrium theoryoligopolistic price setting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Learning and Pricing with Models That Do Not Explicitly Incorporate Competition ⋮ THE LONG RUN OUTCOMES AND GLOBAL DYNAMICS OF A DUOPOLY GAME WITH MISSPECIFIED DEMAND FUNCTIONS ⋮ A PRICE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS IN A MODEL OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION

Cites Work

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• Rational Expectations Equilibria, Learning, and Model Specification
• Controlling a Stochastic Process with Unknown Parameters
• Optimal Control of an Unknown Linear Process with Learning

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