How to Organize Crime1

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2008.00508.XMaRDI QIDQ3528170zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mariagiovanna Baccara, Heski Bar-Isaac

Publication date 8 October 2008

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00508.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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• Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy
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• Optimal design and defense of networks under link attacks

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