Network stability under limited foresight
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Cites work
- A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
- Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
- Cautious farsighted stability in network formation games with streams of payoffs
- Coalition formation and history dependence
- Cognitive hierarchies in adaptive play
- Equilibrium coalitional behavior
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Farsighted network formation
- Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations
- Farsightedly stable networks
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
- Matching with myopic and farsighted players
- Maximality in the farsighted stable set
- Networks and farsighted stability
- On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
- Rational expectations and farsighted stability
- Stability of networks under horizon-\(K\) farsightedness
- Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- Strongly stable networks
- The Evolution of Conventions
- The farsighted stable set
- The myopic stable set for social environments
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