Strategic manipulation in judgment aggregation under higher-level reasoning

DOI10.1007/S11238-021-09833-0MaRDI QIDQ2114570zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Zoi Terzopoulou, Ulle Endriss

Publication date 15 March 2022

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09833-0

zbMATH Keywords

votingsocial choice theorymanipulationjudgment aggregation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Aggregating sets of judgments: two impossibility results compared. With a comment by Isaac Levi
• Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation
• Complexity of judgment aggregation
• Judgment aggregation
• Logics in Artificial Intelligence
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Multiagent Systems
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• Plurality voting with truth-biased agents
• Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting.
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information
• The complexity landscape of outcome determination in judgment aggregation
• The handbook of rational and social choice. An overview of new foundations and applications.
• The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review

Cited in

(4)

• Preferences over procedures and outcomes in judgment aggregation: an experimental study
• Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information
• Strategic behaviour and manipulation resistance in peer-to-peer, crowdsourced information gathering
• Strategic manipulation in group decisions with pairwise comparisons: a game theoretical perspective

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