Strategic manipulation in judgment aggregation under higher-level reasoning

DOI10.1007/S11238-021-09833-0zbMATH Open1484.91176OpenAlexW3180633818MaRDI QIDQ2114570FDOQ2114570

Zoi Terzopoulou, Ulle Endriss

Publication date: 15 March 2022

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09833-0

zbMATH Keywords

votingsocial choice theorymanipulationjudgment aggregation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation
• Complexity of Judgment Aggregation
• Multiagent Systems
• The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Aggregating sets of judgments: two impossibility results compared. With a comment by Isaac Levi
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Logics in Artificial Intelligence
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Judgment Aggregation
• Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting.
• Plurality Voting with Truth-Biased Agents
• Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information
• The Complexity Landscape of Outcome Determination in Judgment Aggregation

Cited In (1)

• Strategic behaviour and manipulation resistance in peer-to-peer, crowdsourced information gathering

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