Inefficiency of equilibria in Doodle polls

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-04651-4_48MaRDI QIDQ2327151zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Barbara M. Anthony, Christine Chung

Publication date 11 October 2019

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04651-4_48

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaapproval votingdoodle polls

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problem solving in the context of artificial intelligence (heuristics, search strategies, etc.) (68T20) Combinatorial optimization (90C27)

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Cited in

(1)

• Equilibria in Doodle polls under three tie-breaking rules

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