Inefficiency of equilibria in Doodle polls

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-04651-4_48OpenAlexW2900502444MaRDI QIDQ2327151FDOQ2327151

Authors: Barbara M. Anthony, Christine Chung 

Publication date: 11 October 2019

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04651-4_48

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zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaapproval votingdoodle polls

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problem solving in the context of artificial intelligence (heuristics, search strategies, etc.) (68T20) Combinatorial optimization (90C27)

Cited In (1)

• Equilibria in Doodle polls under three tie-breaking rules

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