The computational impact of partial votes on strategic voting

MaRDI QIDQ5283030zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Nina Narodytska, Toby Walsh

Publication date 18 July 2017

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.7714, http://ebooks.iospress.nl/volumearticle/37016

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting
• Determining possible and necessary winners given partial orders
• Strategic voting and nomination
• Manipulative elicitation -- a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences
• Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting

Cited in

(5)

• Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best?
• Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting
• Iterative voting with partial preferences
• Toward Computing the Margin of Victory in Single Transferable Vote Elections
• Single-peaked consistency for weak orders is easy

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