The computational impact of partial votes on strategic voting

zbMATH Open1366.91084arXiv1405.7714MaRDI QIDQ5283030FDOQ5283030

Authors: Nina Narodytska, Toby Walsh 

Publication date: 18 July 2017

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.7714

Recommendations

• Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting
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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cited In (5)

• Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting
• Iterative voting with partial preferences
• Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best?
• Single-peaked consistency for weak orders is easy
• Toward Computing the Margin of Victory in Single Transferable Vote Elections

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