Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_3MaRDI QIDQ6637497zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ahmad Awde, Mostapha Diss, Eric Kamwa, Julien Yves Rolland, Abdelmonaim Tlidi

Publication date 13 November 2024

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Condorcet winners and social acceptability
• Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes
• Evaluating voting systems with probability models. Essays by and in honor of William Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
• Exploiting polyhedral symmetries in social choice
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1414348 (Why is no real title available?)
• Polytope volume by descent in the face lattice and applications in social choice
• Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
• Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
• The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution
• The socially acceptable scoring rule
• The technique of the Nanson preferential majority system of election.
• Voter Antagonism and the Paradox of Voting
• Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
• Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?

Cited in

(1)

• Preference aggregation in the generalised unavailable candidate model

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