Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.07.006MaRDI QIDQ1668501zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jerry S. Kelly, Shaofang Qi

Publication date 29 August 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.006

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicitypluralityanonymityneutralitysocial choice correspondencetops-only

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity
• A characterization result for the plurality rule
• A simple characterization of plurality rule
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
• An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains
• Characterizations of the plurality function
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains

Cited in

(8)

• A simple characterization of the anti-plurality rule
• Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities
• Role of the plurality rule in multiple choices
• A stability property in social choice theory
• Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
• Uniform random dictatorship: a characterization without strategy-proofness
• Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited
• Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency

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