Group support and top-heavy rules

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2004.02.009MaRDI QIDQ1927549zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mark Fey

Publication date 1 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.02.009

zbMATH Keywords

faithfulnessgroup supportplurality rulescoring rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
• Size approval voting
• Weighted approval voting
• Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of approval voting
• Equitable Voting Rules

Cites work

• A characterization result for the plurality rule
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• A simple characterization of plurality rule
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Social Choice Scoring Functions

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