The unexpected behavior of plurality rule

DOI10.1007/S11238-008-9097-ZMaRDI QIDQ1036103zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley

Publication date 4 November 2009

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9097-z

zbMATH Keywords

voting rulessingle-peaked preferencesCondorcet efficieny

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

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• Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
• Condorcet efficiencies under the maximal culture condition
• Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
• Condorcet’s Paradox
• Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic
• On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
• Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
• Probabilities of election outcomes with two parameters: the relative impact of unifying and polarizing candidates
• Scoring rules, Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity
• Social choice and individual values
• The sensitivity of weight selection for scoring rules to profile proximity to single-peaked preferences

Cited in

(10)

• The plurality majority converse under single peakedness
• An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
• A simple characterization of the anti-plurality rule
• Role of the plurality rule in multiple choices
• The sensitivity of weight selection for scoring rules to profile proximity to single-peaked preferences
• The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
• Plurality rule works in three-candidate elections
• IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
• The scoring rules in an endogenous election
• On the probability of observing Borda's paradox

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