Group size as selection device

DOI10.1007/S00199-026-01714-3MaRDI QIDQ7397490zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Francesco De Sinopoli, Leo Ferraris, Claudia Meroni

Publication date 2026

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00199-026-01714-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

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• Poisson-Cournot games
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• Private provision of discrete public goods
• Public protests and policy making
• Strategic stability in Poisson games
• Viable Nash equilibria: an experiment

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