When do simple policies win?

DOI10.1007/S00199-011-0620-ZzbMATH Open1277.91155OpenAlexW2026918318MaRDI QIDQ412086FDOQ412086

Ronny Razin, Gilat Levy

Publication date: 3 May 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0620-z

Recommendations

• Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
• EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
• Argumentation in multi-issue debates
• Credible debate equilibria
• Deliberative democracy and electoral competition

zbMATH Keywords

complexitydebatesdynamic all-pay auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Contest success functions
• Multi-battle contests
• Decisiveness of contributors' perceptions in elections
• The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.

Cited In (3)

• Introduction to the symposium in political economy
• The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities
• The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game

This page was built for publication: When do simple policies win?

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q412086)