When do simple policies win?

DOI10.1007/S00199-011-0620-ZMaRDI QIDQ412086zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gilat Levy, Ronny Razin

Publication date 3 May 2012

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0620-z

zbMATH Keywords

complexitydebatesdynamic all-pay auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
• EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
• Argumentation in multi-issue debates
• Credible debate equilibria
• Deliberative democracy and electoral competition

Cites work

• Contest success functions
• Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
• Decisiveness of contributors' perceptions in elections
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• Multi-battle contests
• The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections

Cited in

(3)

• Introduction to the symposium in political economy
• The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game
• The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities

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