An experimental investigation of optimal learning in coordination games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2573zbMath0962.91009OpenAlexW2568762146MaRDI QIDQ1976445

Andreas Blume, Uri Gneezy

Publication date: 10 May 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52597

zbMATH Keywords

languagecoordinationcommon knowledgeoptimal learningrepeated coordination games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Coordination via correlation: an experimental study, When learning meets salience, Symmetric play in repeated allocation games, Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: experimental evidence, Costly and discrete communication: an experimental investigation, Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: an experimental study, Compromise and coordination: an experimental study, Coordination and learning with a partial language, A learning-efficiency explanation of structure in language

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