Variable-frame level-\(n\) theory

DOI10.1006/game.2000.0796zbMath1006.91003OpenAlexW2166573126MaRDI QIDQ1590687

Michael Bacharach, Dale O. II Stahl

Publication date: 21 December 2000

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0796

zbMATH Keywords

payoff-dominanceframe-induced optionsrational variable frame theorySchelling competence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

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Cites Work

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• The variable frame theory of focal points: An experimental study
• Focal points in framed strategic forms
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study