Does information transparency decrease coordination failure?
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Publication:608530
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.03.005zbMATH Open1200.91060OpenAlexW3123584492MaRDI QIDQ608530FDOQ608530
Authors: Regina M. Anctil, John Dickhaut, Cathleen Johnson, Chandra Kanodia
Publication date: 25 November 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.03.005
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Cites Work
- Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
- On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
- The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information
- Cursed Equilibrium
- Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
- Public information, private information, and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games.
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