Does information transparency decrease coordination failure?

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.03.005zbMath1200.91060OpenAlexW3123584492MaRDI QIDQ608530

John Dickhaut, Chandra Kanodia, Regina M. Anctil, Cathleen Johnson

Publication date: 25 November 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.03.005

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionprivate informationrisk dominancestrategic uncertaintylevel-\(k\) thinking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Public information, private information, and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games.
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• Cursed Equilibrium
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information

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