Information transparency and equilibrium selection in coordination games: an experimental study
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
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- Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
- Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations: An experimental study
- Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games
- Promises and Partnership
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- Social framing effects: preferences or beliefs?
- The framing of games and the psychology of play
- When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory
Cited in
(4)- Equilibrium selection in coordination games: an experimental study of the role of higher order beliefs in strategic decisions
- Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1795153 (Why is no real title available?)
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