Information transparency and equilibrium selection in coordination games: an experimental study

DOI10.1007/S11238-016-9572-XzbMATH Open1395.91092OpenAlexW2522171994MaRDI QIDQ2628293FDOQ2628293

Authors: Jia Liu, Yohanes E. Riyanto 

Publication date: 1 June 2017

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://eprint.ncl.ac.uk/fulltext.aspx?url=227891/CB3AFDCE-07D8-4D9F-A36B-E6C5F30A012A.pdf&pub_id=227891

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zbMATH Keywords

coordination gamesequilibrium selectioninformation disclosurecentralized punishmentcentralized reward

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Promises and Partnership
• The framing of games and the psychology of play
• Maximization, learning, and economic behavior
• Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games.
• Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games
• A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information
• When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory
• Social framing effects: preferences or beliefs?
• Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations: An experimental study
• Coordination and information: Recent experimental evidence
• Endogenous transfers in the prisoner's dilemma game: an experimental test of cooperation and coordination

Cited In (4)

• Equilibrium selection in coordination games: an experimental study of the role of higher order beliefs in strategic decisions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Uses Software

• Stata
• Z-Tree
• xtabond2

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