Equilibrium selection in coordination games: an experimental study of the role of higher order beliefs in strategic decisions

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-55702-1_29zbMATH Open1376.91041OpenAlexW2737336398MaRDI QIDQ4596459FDOQ4596459

Authors: Thomas Neumann, Bodo Vogt 

Publication date: 1 December 2017

Published in: Operations Research Proceedings 2016 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55702-1_29

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cited In (3)

• Behavioral influences on strategic interactions outcomes in game theory models
• Sleep restriction and strategy choice in cooperation and coordination games
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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