A Bargaining Model Where Parties Make Errors

DOI10.2307/2938376MaRDI QIDQ4271332zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hans Carlsson

Publication date 9 January 1994

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2938376

zbMATH Keywords

bilateral bargainingincomplete information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cited in

(18)

• Minimax-regret strategies for bargaining over several variables
• Noisy equilibrium selection in coordination games
• Noise-proof equilibria in two-action signaling games
• Implementing egalitarianism in a class of Nash demand games
• Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game
• Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
• Reasonable Nash demand games
• Random-settlement arbitration and the generalized Nash solution: one-shot and infinite-horizon cases
• Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions: a simple Nash program
• Pledge-and-review bargaining
• (In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games
• BARGAINING POWER IN THE NASH DEMAND GAME AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
• Mixed-strategy equilibria in the Nash demand game
• Bargaining with revoking costs
• Endogenous barriers to learning
• Nash's demand game and resource-allocation
• Nash smoothing on the test bench: H_-essential equilibria
• Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash demand game

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