The value of a coordination game
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Publication:2138069
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2022.105419zbMath1490.91015OpenAlexW4213175554MaRDI QIDQ2138069
Wouter Kager, Willemien Kets, Alvaro Sandroni
Publication date: 11 May 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105419
coordinationvaluesupermodular gamesstrategic complementaritiespolicy designcomparative statics on welfare
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