Comparative statics of mixed-strategy equilibria in noncooperative two- person games

DOI10.1007/BF00134647MaRDI QIDQ794561zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Vincent P. Crawford, Dennis E. Smallwood

Publication date 1984

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

large payoff matrixzero-sum two-person games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

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• Comparison of equilibrium actions and payoffs across players in games of strategic complements
• Equilibrium without independence
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