Comparative statics of mixed-strategy equilibria in noncooperative two- person games

DOI10.1007/BF00134647zbMATH Open0539.90105MaRDI QIDQ794561FDOQ794561

Authors: Vincent P. Crawford, Dennis E. Smallwood 

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

large payoff matrixzero-sum two-person games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Compulsory Arbitration, Arbitral Risk and Negotiated Settlements: A Case Study in Bargaining under Imperfect Information

Cited In (9)

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• Equilibrium without independence
• David vs. Goliath: An Analysis of Asymmetric Mixed-Strategy Games and Experimental Evidence
• Comparison of equilibrium actions and payoffs across players in games of strategic complements
• The unprofitability of mixed-strategy equilibria in two-person games: a second folk-theorem
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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